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Groundwater contamination and nonpoint source pollution of ground
and surface waters are two of the most significant environmental problems
of the 1980's.1 Although largely ignored in existing water pollution legis-
lation, federal' and state3 attention to these problems has increased sub-
stantially in recent years. Nevertheless, because both types of pollution are
intimately related to land use, Congress and state governments are reluc-
tant to regulate them: Land use is commonly considered a purely local
concern.
This Note argues that this reluctance is no longer justified. In recent
years, many states have recognized the inadequacies of local land use reg-
ulation, particularly in the environmental context. Local underregulation,
by encouraging or tolerating harmful land uses, has adverse regional envi-
ronmental consequences. Moreover, it may cause regional economic harm
1. See Tarlock, Prevention of Groundwater Contamination, 8 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 121,
121 (1985) (groundwater pollution); 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 296 (1984) (Milwaukee Mayor Henry
W. Maier: nonpoint pollution "might be the biggest environmental problem we are facing today;"
Rep. Robert W. Edgar (D-Pa): nonpoint pollution is "the most important water issue we face in the
1980s and 1990s").
2. The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986 contain a voluntary, experimental pro-
gram which represents the first attempt by Congress to delineate a comprehensive groundwater pro-
tection scheme. The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339 (signed into
law June 19, 1986, Statement on Signing S. 124 Into Law, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 831
(1986)). Proposed drafts of the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1986 have included a special
nonpoint source pollution control program. See S. 1128, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 112, § 319, 131
CONG. REC. H6107-09 (daily ed. July 23, 1985).
3. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, AIR AND WATER POLLUTION CONTROL LAW: 1982,
at 528 (1982) (nonpoint pollution); V. PYE, R. PATRICK & J. QUARLES, GROUNDWATER CONTAMI-
NATION IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (1983) (groundwater).
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by creating a favorable regulatory climate that attracts desirable develop-
ment from more carefully regulated communities. Local overregulation, by
diverting land uses to less environmentally suitable sites, also has adverse
regional environmental consequences. In addition, it may operate to ex-
clude or restrict essential land uses, such as lower income housing, to the
socioeconomic detriment of the region. This Note demonstrates that the
legal doctrines and policy approaches which states have developed to deal
with these problems can and should be applied to groundwater and
nonpoint source pollution control. And because the federal water pollution
control effort cannot succeed without effective control of groundwater and
nonpoint source pollution, this Note further argues that federal water pol-
lution control legislation must explicitly encourage and direct state regula-
tion of defects in the local land use decisionmaking process.
I. THE REGULATORY PROBLEM
Groundwater and nonpoint source pollution problems are distinguished
by their intimate relation to land use. Groundwater is subsurface water
"that occurs in permeable saturated strata of rock, sand, or gravel called
aquifers."4 Aquifers are recharged primarily by the filtration of precipita-
tion or surface water through recharge zones-those portions of the land
surface composed of especially permeable soils.5 Most groundwater con-
tamination originates from the land surface.
Nonpoint source pollution-pollution from diffuse sources-threatens
both ground and surface water quality.7 As with groundwater contamina-
tion, most nonpoint source pollution emanates from the land surface, usu-
ally in the form of runoff or seepage.
Waste disposal sites are the source of much groundwater and nonpoint
pollution.8 However, land uses not devoted to waste disposal are a very
4. V. PYE, R. PATRICK & J. QUARLES, supra note 3, at 2.
5. See Tripp & Jaffe, Preventing Groundwater Pollution: Towards a Coordinated Strategy to
Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1979).
6. Nonpoint source pollution can be defined as all water pollution that does not derive from a
point source. A point source is any "discernible, confined and discrete conveyance," such as a pipe,
ditch, well, or container, from which pollutants may be discharged. Clean Water Act § 502(14), 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1982).
7. See CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT: AN ASSESSMENT AT MID-
DECADE 123 (1984); V. NOVOTNY & G. CHESTERS, HANDBOOK OF NONPOINT POLLUTION 269
(1981).
8. See L. ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING 397 (1984)
(nonpoint pollutants related to waste disposal include "discharges from solid waste disposal sites, and
wastewaters from septic tanks, cesspools, and industrial lagoons") (footnote omitted); Pye & Kelley,
The Extent of Groundwater Contamination in the United States, in GROUNDWATER CONTAMINA-
TION 23, 24 (Geophysics Study Comm. ed. 1984) (sources of groundwater pollution related to waste
disposal include landfills, septic tanks, industrial impoundments, and deep-well waste injection).
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common cause of equally serious but less obvious groundwater and
nonpoint source pollution problems.'
A. The Regulatory Differential
The national water pollution control effort, directed primarily by the
Clean Water Act (CWA), 10 presently focuses on the most visible and eas-
ily regulated form of pollution-point source discharges into surface wa-
ters.11 To control these discharges, CWA sets forth an extensive, federally
enforceable system of effluent and ambient standards designed to be ad-
ministered primarily by the states.1 2 Section 208,13 which focuses on re-
gional planning requirements for the construction of federally funded
waste treatment facilities, contains CWA's only program for groundwater
and nonpoint source pollution control. 14 But these provisions merely re-
quire states to identify existing problems and develop measures for their
control. Federal enforcement of this vague directive is limited to denial of
CWA planning grants15 or withdrawal of EPA approval of a state's point
source discharge permit program. 18
This wide regulatory differential is difficult to justify. Groundwater
9. Most ground and surface water contamination unrelated to waste disposal derives from
nonpoint sources. Nonpoint sources of such contamination include mine drainage, saltwater intrusion,
and runoff or seepage from agriculture, silviculture, urban development, and construction sites. See
CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note 7, at 123-28.
10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
11. "Point source" is defined supra note 6. CWA declares that "the discharge of any pollutant by
any person" is unlawful unless explicitly permitted. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (1982). This broad prohibi-
tory language is in fact directed only at point source discharges made directly into navigable surface
waters. Id. § 1362(12). See also Kelley v. United States, No. G83-630 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 1985)
(CWA does not apply to discharges into groundwater, everi if they eventually migrate into surface
waters); DiNovo & Jaffe, Local Regulations for Groundwater Protection Part I: Sensitive-Area
Controls, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., May 1984, at 6, 7 (EPA does not apply CWA to ground-
water). A variety of other federal statutes provide some protection for groundwater in a piecemeal
fashion. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GROUND-WATER PROTEC-
TION STRATEGY 31 (1984) [hereinafter cited as GROUND-WATER STRATEGY]. The Safe Drinking
Water Act Amendments of 1986 establish a program for state protection of areas surrounding wells
which supply public water systems. The program is essentially voluntary because enforcement is lim-
ited to EPA denial of funding for the program's implementation. The Safe Drinking Water Act
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339 (signed into law June 19, 1986, Statement on Signing S.
124 Into Law, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 831 (1986)).
12. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1345 (1982). Effluent standards are uniform standards applied to the
quality of waste discharges into receiving waters. Ambient standards regulate the quality of receiving
waters. Pollutant sources are identified and regulated to the extent necessary to maintain the ambient
standards.
13. Id. § 1288.
14. Id. § 1288(b)(2)(F)-(K).
15. See id. §§ 1285(g), 12850); 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.300, 35.350 (1985).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (1982). See Goldfarb, Water Quality Management Planning: The Fate
of 208, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 105, 123 (1976) (questioning effectiveness of this sanction); see also D.
MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION 54 (Supp. 1978) ("there ap-
pears to be no unalloyed obligation to adopt a 208 plan once it is prepared").
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provides drinking water to over half of the American population,"' feeds
and is fed by surface water,18 and once contaminated is virtually impossi-
ble to clean.19 Nonpoint source pollutants (whether or not related to waste
disposal) can be as dangerous as point source discharges,20 and can render
successful point source control a nullity.21 Groundwater and nonpoint
source pollution now threaten to completely overshadow the problem of
point source pollution of surface waters.2
The regulatory differential can be attributed in significant part to the
need to regulate land use in order to control groundwater and nonpoint
source pollution. Land use regulation is widely considered a local preroga-
tive.23 Thus, state legislatures and Congress have been reluctant to include
such regulation in their water pollution legislation.
B. The Need for Land Use Regulation
Groundwater and nonpoint source pollution are difficult, and often im-
possible, to regulate by the traditional methods used to regulate point
source discharges into surface water: effluent and ambient standards.
2 4 Ef-
17. GROUND-WATER STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 11.
18. V. PYE, R. PATRICK & J. QUARLES, supra note 3, at 4. Because ground and surface waters
are interconnected, "[p]rotection of one . . . is meaningless without concomitant measures to protect
the other." Note, Section 1424(e) of the Safe Drinking Water Act: An Effective Measure Against
Groundwater Pollution?, 6 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 50121, 50121 (1976).
19. V. PYE, R. PATRICK & J. QUARLES, supra note 3, at 269.
20. See E. LAWS, AQUATIC POLLUTION 90 (1981) (agricultural and urban runoff); V. NOVOTNY
& G. CHESTERS, supra note 7, at 2, 11, 314; L. ORTOLANO, supra note 8, at 397.
21.
[I]t has been estimated that perhaps 80% of the urban areas in the United States will not
realize increased water quality from extensive treatment of point sources. . . . Recent evidence
indicates that pollution inputs from nonpoint sources in the form of stormwater runoff or
drainage due to routine land use practices is responsible for a large part of the degradation of
surface water quality.
T. WAITE, PRINCIPLES OF WATER QUALITY 255-56 (1984) (emphasis in original).
22. The Conservation Foundation concludes that "[wlhile the quality of surface water may be at
least holding its own, groundwater quality may be deteriorating." CONSERVATION FOUNDATION,
supra note 7, at xxv. In addition, one of "the most important reasons for the lack of progress in
controlling many water pollutants [is] that: very little effort has been made to control nonpoint sources
.... " Id. See also V. NOVOTNY & G. CHESTERs, supra note 7, at 2 ("Nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion account for more than 50% of the total water quality problem . . . ."); Getches, Controlling
Groundwater Use and Quality: A Fragmented System, 17 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 623, 631 (1985)
(groundwater pollution poses "graver threat" than surface water pollution).
23. See L. ORTOLANO, supra note 8, at 216; Michelman, Localism and Political Freedom, in
THE LAND USE POLICY DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES 239 (J. de Neufville ed. 1981).
24. Effluent standards may not protect groundwater from point source contamination because it is
extremely difficult to determine how a particular discharge will affect water quality. See ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW INSTITrUTE, supra note 3, at 663. Because of their dispersed nature, nonpoint pollu-
tants cannot be regulated by effluent standards. Pisano, Nonpoint Pollution: An EPA View of Area-
wide Water Quality Management, 31 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 94, 95-96 (1976).
Ambient standards are difficult to maintain because it is often impossible to trace the cause of a
violation, especially, as is common with nonpoint pollution, if there are many nearby sources of the
pollutant. See L. ORTOLANO, supra note 8, at 116. The hidden nature of groundwater may make
significant ambient monitoring impossible. See GROUND-WATER STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 16.
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fective regulation must include broader controls aimed directly at pollu-
tion-causing land uses,25 particularly when pollution is caused by activi-
ties unrelated to waste disposal.2 Most types of development, whether
urban/industrial, 27  suburban/residential, 8  or rural/agricultural, 29 can
contribute to groundwater and nonpoint source pollution. Land use regu-
lations which can prevent such pollution fall into two categories. Land use
controls, which regulate the location of land uses, may, for example, pro-
hibit certain types 0 or densities31 of land use. In addition, land manage-
25. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at 663 (groundwater); V. NOVOTNY &
G. CHEsTERS, supra note 7, at 391-433, 439-58 (nonpoint pollution); V. PYE, R. PATRICK & J.
QUARLES, supra note 3, at 268-69 (groundwater); Goldfarb, supra note 16, at 107 (nonpoint pollu-
tion); Miller, Protection of Groundwater Quality, in GROUNDWATER POLLUTION: ENVIRONMENTAL
AND LEGAL PROBLEMS 93, 123, 128-29 (C. Travis & E. Etnier eds. 1984) (groundwater/nonpoint
pollution); Stephenson & Lemmon, Land Use Controls to Protect Groundwater Quality in the Arid
Southwest, 5 ENVTL. PROF. 98 (1983) (groundwater); Tarlock, supra note 1, at 122 ("Since ground-
water contamination is largely a function of what land uses are allowed over an aquifer, local govern-
ments have begun to expand their land use controls to include aquifer protection strategies."); Tripp
& Jaffe, supra note 5, at 34 (land use controls are necessary to protect groundwater because "the
technology for controlling groundwater pollution from waste facilities is simply not adequate to assure
non-degradation," and "no technology can control the nonpoint source contamination inevitably re-
sulting from intensive residential, commercial, and industrial development").
26. See V. PYE, R. PATRICK & J. QUARLES, supra note 3, at 261-62 (pollutants from sources
unrelated to waste disposal "are so diffuse that they cannot ordinarily be reached by direct regulation,
but only indirectly through restrictions on the activities that generate them").
27. See City of Austin v. Jamail, 662 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (nonpoint pollution);
V. NOVOTNY & G. CHESTERS, supra note 7, at 7-9, 312-45 (same); see also T. WAITE, supra note
21, at 256 (urban runoff "contains organic wastes, bacterial contaminants, metals, suspended solids,
and other pollutants"); Stephenson & Lemmon, supra note 25, at 101, 104 (industrial development
may cause contamination of groundwater by toxic chemicals).
28. See In re Spring Valley Development, 300 A.2d 736, 740 n.2 (Me. 1973) (groundwater/
nonpoint pollution); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount
Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 311-12, 456 A.2d 390, 469 (1983) (same); see also V. NOVOTNY & G.
CHESTERS, supra note 7, at 393, 407 (groundwater/nonpoint pollution from residential development
includes discharges from septic tanks, erosion, and wash-off of street dust and curb refuse).
29. See CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note 7, at 123-25 (agricqltural lands are greatest
source of nonpoint pollution, "contributing most of the sediment, nitrogen, phosphorus, and [biochem-
ical oxygen demand] entering U.S. surface waters"); P. KRENKEL & V. NOVOTNY, WATER QUALITY
MANAGEMENT 219-35 (1980) (nonpoint pollution caused by rural/agricultural land use).
30. In certain circumstances, development must be prohibited altogether. For example, to protect
groundwater, development may be banned in the area surrounding a well. See DiNovo & Jaffe, supra
note 11, at 10-11. To prevent nonpoint pollution of surface waters, development may be banned on
the land immediately surrounding a watercourse. See id. at 12.
Or, land use controls may focus more narrowly on restricting specific sources of harmful pollutants,
such as waste landfills, commercial enterprises that store or use hazardous materials, housing develop-
ments that utilize septic tanks, commercial development in sensitive areas, or land uses that contribute
significantly to erosion. See DiNovo & Jaffe, Local Regulations for Groundwater Protection Part II:
Source Controls, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June 1984, at 5, 5-8; DiNovo & Jaffe, supra note
11, at 11-13; Harrington, Krupnick & Peskin, Policies for Nonpoint-source Water Pollution Con-
trol, 40 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 27, 29 (1985); Stephenson & Lemmon, supra note 25, at
101, 103-04.
Another regulatory approach that tends to be more closely tailored to the impact of an activity on
water quality is the performance standard. Performance standards do not restrict specified land uses,
but rather restrict only those land uses that cause a particular adverse effect, such as sediment pollu-
tion. See Harrington, Krupnick & Peskin, supra, at 29.
31. See GROUND-WATER STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 23 (limitations on density of commercial
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ment regulations often must be prescribed to prevent pollution from land
uses not prohibited by location controls. 2
C. The Inadequacy of Existing Regulation
The EPA has very limited authority to regulate land uses 3 that
threaten groundwater quality 4 and/or cause nonpoint pollution. More-
over, CWA has done little to encourage state regulation of such land uses.
When enacted, section 208 was considered the "most important aspect of a
water pollution control strategy" largely because of its land planning pro-
visions.3 Congress recognized that "[u]ncontrolled growth and expansion
and competition among units of government will be reduced if effective
environmental controls are to be imposed."' 7 Yet section 208 contains
neither procedural nor substantive requirements designed to enhance state
control over land uses that cause groundwater or nonpoint source
pollution.38
or residential development over aquifer recharge areas); V. PYE, R. PATRICK & J. QUARLES, supra
note 3, at 268 (same); V. NOVOTNY & G. CHESTERS, supra note 7, at 440 (use of density regulation
to control nonpoint pollution).
32. See Federman, The 1972 Water Pollution Control Act: Unforeseen Implications for Land
Use Planning, 8 URB. LAW. 140, 143 (1976) (nonpoint pollution); Tarlock, supra note 1, at 126
(groundwater).
33. This Note excludes from the term "land use regulation" controls on the operation (as opposed
to the siting) of waste disposal facilities. The EPA has authority to regulate waste disposal facility
operation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6991i (West
1983 & Supp. 1986).
34. The EPA has direct control over land uses which threaten groundwater only under section
1424(e) of the Safe Drinking Water Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(e) (1982). This provision enables the
EPA to withhold federal grants or contracts from any project that threatens to contaminate an aquifer
designated as the sole or principal source of drinking water for a region, if such contamination would
create a significant hazard to public health. Although a useful regulatory tool, section 1424(e) has not
been effectively employed. Tripp, Groundwater Protection Strategies: Federal, State and Local Rela-
tionships, in GROUNDWATER POLLUTION: ENVIRONMENTAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS 131, 146 (C.
Travis & E. Etnier eds. 1984). In addition, its value is greatly limited because it is not incorporated
into a land planning program, and therefore cannot take cumulative development effects into account.
See Note, supra note 18, at 50125-26.
35. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1981, at 83
(1981) (CWA "gives EPA no specific authority to regulate pollution from nonpoint sources"). But see
33 U.S.C. §§ 1288(b)(4)(B)-(C), 1344 (1982) (establishing federal authority to control nonpoint pol-
lution from dredging and filling activities in wetlands if state does not develop adequate program for
control of such pollution); id. § 1314(e) (granting EPA authority under very limited circumstances to
regulate land management practices in order to control industrial nonpoint pollution).
36. See 1 SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93D CONG., 1sT SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 782 (Comm. Print 1973).
37. S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3668, 3704.
38. Section 208 merely suggests that "land use requirements" be one of the methods utilized to
control nonpoint pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(2)(F)-(H) (1982). Moreover, it provides for regional
rather than state supervision of areas with "substantial water quality control problems." Id. §
1288(a)(2).
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Although a few states have developed land use programs for land over-
lying particularly sensitive and valuable aquifers, 9 no state has imple-
mented a statewide program directed at protecting groundwater. 40 Instead,
the states have relied upon local governments to protect groundwater
through zoning and public health regulations. 41 Similarly, responsibility
for regulating nonpoint source pollution lies largely at the local level.42
Most local programs are voluntary.'3
In short, though acknowledging the value of land use regulation in pro-
tecting the environment, section 208 leaves states free to determine
whether they will utilize such regulation to control groundwater and
nonpoint source pollution. The states in turn have largely delegated re-
sponsibility for these problems to local governments. Yet relying on local
governments to voluntarily use land use regulation to control groundwater
and nonpoint source pollution makes little more sense than relying on in-
dustrial and municipal point source dischargers to regulate themselves. As
with self-regulation by the latter, self-regulation by the former imposes
substantial external costs.
II. UNDERREGULATION
Since the 1970's, a number of states have developed legislation provid-
ing for some form of state control over land use." Most of this legislation
has been prompted by the failure of local governments adequately to regu-
late the adverse environmental consequences of development. 4'5 Absent
state regulation, local governments are able to encourage or tolerate harm-
39. Two of the most extensive such programs have been developed by New Jersey (Pine Barrens)
and Texas (Edwards Aquifer). See Tripp & Jaffe, supra note 5, at 38-42.
40. See V. PYE, R. PATRICK & J. QUARLES, supra note 3, at 269 ("Land-use controls have...
not yet been applied in any state except in reference to special, localized situations."); cf GROUND-
WATER STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 22 ("Several States have the authority to impose some type of
State land-use controls, but only a few actively use them to protect ground water.").
41. DiNovo & Jaffe, supra note 11, at 7. Even groundwater-conscious states such as Connecticut
and Florida have largely delegated regulatory responsibilities to local governments by merely author-
izing them to use zoning powers to protect aquifers. See V. P'YE, R. PATRICK & J. QUARLES, supra
note 3, at 275, 277. This approach is not always ineffective. For example, Southington, Connecticut,
has incorporated an extensive groundwater protection program into its zoning ordinance. See DiNovo
& Jaffe, supra note 11, at 11-12.
42. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at 517; V. NOVOTNY & G. CHESTERS,
supra note 7, at 19-20; Massey, Land Use Regulatory Power of Conservation Districts in the Mid-
western States for Controlling Nonpoint Source Pollutants, 33 DRAKE L. REV. 35, 36-37 (1983-84).
This local emphasis continues even though in the 1970's the EPA concluded that, due to "potential
political impediments and the lack of available sanctions," state rather than local governments would
have to be largely responsible for implementing nonpoint source regulations. Goldfarb, supra note 16,
at 129.
43. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 35, at 83; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 3, at 523.
44. See generally R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, LAND USE AND THE STATES (2d ed. 1979)
(describing state programs).
45. See id. at 1; J. KUSLER, REGULATING SENSITIVE LANDS at vii (1980).
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ful land uses without considering the consequences which extend beyond
local boundaries. Because underregulation of harmful land uses results
from defects in the local land use decisionmaking process, many states
have found that the process itself is an appropriate object of regulation. A
process-oriented approach that requires local governments to develop land
use programs to control groundwater and nonpoint source pollution, and
enables states to correct the programs' inadequacies, can ensure that local
governments consider regional and state water quality interests.4
A. Environmental Spillovers
A community may tolerate pollution-causing land uses because of a de-
sire to attract development, or a reluctance to regulate politically influen-
tial land users.'7 But another important cause of inadequate land use reg-
ulation is simply the financial, technical, or legal inability of many local
governments to investigate environmental problems and design effective
cures. 8 As a result, local land use controls commonly operate to promote
local economic development at the expense of the environment.4
To the extent that they do take steps to protect the environment
through the regulation of land use, local authorities tend to focus on
amenity values (e.g., aesthetics, recreation, open spaces, clean-looking
lakes or streams, elimination of obvious pollutant sources) rather than on
technically oriented public health needs.50 The effects of regulations which
protect local amenities are more readily observable, and thus such regula-
tions may be more politically acceptable.51 As a result, groundwater and
46. Because local governments acquire their authority to regulate land use from the states, the
states are in the best position to remove the authority that allows local land use decisions to adversely
affect regional or state interests. See Delogu, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time Has
Passed, 36 ME. L. REV. 261, 297-98 & n.102 (1984). Because state interests are involved, home rule
is not a significant legal obstacle. See Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427,
1619 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
Reliance on regional agencies is not a viable alternative. Generally controlled by local authorities,
and lacking a distinct political constituency, regional organizations are likely to be as unwilling and
unable to control harmful land use practices as local governments. See Godschalk & Brower, Beyond
the City Limits: Regional Equity as an Emerging Issue, 15 URB. L. ANN. 159, 196-98 (1978); Devel-
opments, supra, at 1591-92.
47. See Developments, supra note 46, at 1590.
48. See R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 189 ("Local governments may find it
difficult ... to impose conditions on projects which are built on land already zoned to that use
..... "); Developments, supra note 46, at 1591 (localities "frequently lack the personnel and exper-
tise necessary to handle the complexities of environmental land use planning") (footnote omitted).
49. See Developments, supra note 46, at 1590.
50. Cf. C. MILLER & C. WOOD, PLANNING AND POLLUTrrION 108 (1983) (discussing concerns of
local authorities in U.K.). This may in part explain why "[t]he growth of scientific knowledge perti-
nent to land use policy has not yet been adequately accommodated in the law." Caldwell, Law and
Land: The Ecology and Sociology of Land Use Planning, in LAND IN AMERICA 187, 205 (R. An-
drews ed. 1979). Caldwell cites policies to protect aquifers and groundwater as two key examples of
policies which "often run against the grain of the law." Id.
51. See V. NovoTNY & G. CHrsrEsRs, supra note 7, at 488 ("The priorities in ... a [local
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nonpoint source pollution control may suffer-efforts to regulate such pol-
lution often do little to preserve amenity values.
These flaws in the local land use decisionmaking process become a mat-
ter of state concern in the event of intermunicipal pollutant spillover from
land uses which cause groundwater or nonpoint source pollution. Even if
a locality is aware of groundwater or nonpoint source pollution problems,
it has little incentive to control them if the costs are borne primarily by
residents outside the host community. State supervision of local land use
regulation can provide the requisite regional perspective.
B. Economic Spillovers
State review of local land use regulations need not rely on environmen-
tal spillovers as its sole justification. Communities with comparatively
weak environmental regulations-"pollution havens"-may cause re-
gional economic harm not directly related to any accompanying environ-
mental damage.
Compared to most forms of pollution control, which are generally sub-
ject to state and federal supervision, local land use regulations are easily
modified and thus particularly susceptible to erosion.52 The reliance of
groundwater and nonpoint source pollution control on land use regulation
thus makes such control particularly susceptible to the "pollution haven"
problem. Intentionally or unintentionally, pollution havens may attract
desirable development from communities with stricter environmental pro-
grams, thereby imposing costs on those communities. Localities with strict
regulatory programs suffer economic harm even without actual migration
of development if pollution control costs discourage economic growth53 or
create price differentials which have an adverse effect on demand for local
products." These adverse economic spillovers caused by pollution havens
justify uniform state pollution control standards regardless of the level of
intermunicipal environmental spillover.55 The fact that economic spil-
lovers are caused by defective public rather than private land use decisions
water quality management] process may frequently be related to the 'visibility' of the pollution input
and its consequences.").
52. See L. ORTOLANO, supra note 8, at 216; Delogu, supra note 46, at 295-96; Shapiro, The
Zoning Variance Power-Constructive in Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REV. 3 (1969).
53. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementa-
tion of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1216 (1977).
54. Cf Heady & Nagadevara, Economic Impacts of State Environmental Programs in a Na-
tional Framework: The Iowa Conservancy Law, 30 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 272, 272, 278
(1975) (environmental restraints on agriculture, if implemented solely in Iowa, would reduce farm
income in state and increase farm income elsewhere in nation).
55. See Stewart, supra note 53, at 1215-16 (both environmental and economic spillovers can jus-
tify centralized regulation).
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provides an additional justification for state regulation of the local land
use decisionmaking process.
C. A Legislative Approach for State Control of Local Underregulation
In recognition of the defects in the local land use decisionmaking pro-
cess, state land use regulation often focuses on the process rather than on
the direct cause of environmental harm-the land user. Under a promi-
nent form of regulation, the state develops guidelines, requires local gov-
ernments to prepare corresponding plans, and reviews local land use regu-
lations or development permits to ensure that they are consistent with the
guidelines.5" This approach is in essence conscriptive: Local governments
are ordered to shoulder the initial burden of developing and enforcing
state land use requirements. After reviewing local efforts for compliance
with state guidelines, the state may modify or replace inconsistent local
regulations, 57 order their amendment by the local government,"8 appeal
56. See J. KusLER, supra note 45, at 8. See generally id. at 175-84 (comprehensive list of state
land use programs).
57. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.05(8) (Harrison Supp. 1984) (if local governments fail to submit
adequate land development regulations for critical areas, state may develop provisions to supplement
or supersede local regulations); M. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 442 (Supp. 1985) (if municipal
shoreland regulation is inadequate, state shall adopt suitable ordinances, which municipality must
then administer and enforce); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116G.09(1) (West Supp. 1986) (if local govern-
ment fails to prepare adequate critical area plans, state will adopt such plans, which "shall apply and
be effective as if adopted by the local unit of government"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.070(2)
(Supp. 1986) (if local government falls to adopt master program for shorelines within its jurisdiction,
state will do so); see also MODEL LAND DEv. CODE § 7-204 (1976) (state may develop critical area
regulations if local effort is inadequate; state-developed regulations will be administered locally as if
they were part of local development ordinance).
An analogous approach involves the application of pre-established state guidelines and/or enforce-
ment measures in the absence of adequate local programs. Once adequate programs are developed, the
validity of proposed land uses is evaluated locally on the basis of conformity with local regulations.
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30519(a), 30600.5, 30604(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1986) (coastal
zone). A number of states have used this approach in order to control certain forms of nonpoint
pollution. For example, under the New Jersey Soil Erosion and Sediment Control Act, N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 4:24-39 to -55 (West Supp. 1985), developments must acquire certification by a local Soil
Conservation District of a plan for soil erosion and sediment control before the development applica-
tion may be approved by a municipality. Id. § 4:24-43. Municipalities which adopt ordinances con-
forming to standards promulgated under the Act, however, are exempt from this requirement. Id. §
4:24-48. See also GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-444(a)-(b) (Supp. 1985) (stating broadly that development
in certain stream corridors that inter alia causes nonpoint pollution is unlawful; once area land and
water use plans are adopted, lawfulness will be judged by reference to area plans); MD. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. § 8-1103 (Supp. 1985) (municipalities may request delegation of enforcement responsibil-
ities for state sediment control requirements; state will enforce requirements if municipality is unable
or unwilling to do so); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113A-54, 113A-60 (1983) (state has general regulatory
authority over erosion and sedimentation; local governments have option to submit erosion and sedi-
ment control program to state for approval).
58. See CAL PuB. REs. CODE §§ 30512(b), 30513 (West Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §
197.320(1) (1985); Cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 443 (Supp. 1985) (municipal officers in
noncompliant communities subject to suit by Attorney General requiring them to enforce state land
use requirements). Maryland uses this approach to control stormwater runoff. See MD. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. § 8-11A-06(d) (1983).
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undesirable land use decisions to an adjudicatory board,59 or penalize local
governments with inadequate regulatory programs.60 Existing state review
programs, however, are almost invariably limited to small, environmen-
tally critical portions of the state.61
A federal program for groundwater and nonpoint source pollution con-
trol should focus on promoting state authority to review and influence
local regulations instead of requiring direct state regulation of land users.
Such an approach is both an effective method of controlling water pollu-
tion and a means of according due attention to local and state interests.
1. Practical Value of State Review of Local Regulations
Environmental harm commonly occurs only as the result of an accumu-
lation of land uses which are in themselves harmless.6 2 Thus, absent some
conception of the course of development within a community, it may be
impossible to designate a particular land use as environmentally harm-
ful.63 Developers often cannot be expected to predict the cumulative im-
pact of development, and generally have little control over the course of
development in a locality. Ultimate responsibility for prediction and con-
trol of the cumulative impacts of development should therefore be placed
on government. 64 Where the course of development threatens water qual-
59. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30625(a) (West Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.07(2)
(Harrison Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58.180(2) (Supp. 1986).
60. One common form of penalty is the withholding of state or federal funding. See Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 234-35,
456 A.2d 390, 429 (1983) (funding decisions based on local compliance with New Jersey State Devel-
opment Guide Plan); OR. REV. STAT. § 197.320(5) (1985) (grant withholding used to enforce state
land use requirements). Another type of penalty entails placing substantial limits on the issuance of
local development permits until adequate regulations are adopted. See OR. REV. STAT. § 197.320(4)
(1985); ef. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 281.640 (West 1979) (under shorelands protection program,
inadequate local zoning ordinances shall have no "force or effect" until approved by state). Maryland
used the threat of a building permit ban to force local governments to adopt stormwater runoff control
ordinances. Benner, Urban Sediment and Stormwater Control: The Maryland Experience, 40 J.
SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 72, 75 (1985).
61. Some state courts, relying on common law and general state zoning enabling and environmen-
tal policy acts, have imposed statewide controls on the adverse regional environmental consequences of
local land use regulation. These courts have held that localities must give reasonable consideration to
regional environmental welfare when making land use decisions. See Committee for Sensible Land
Use v. Garfield Township, 124 Mich. App. 559, 567-70, 335 N.W.2d 216, 220-21 (1983); Save A
Valuable Env't v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 870-72, 576 P.2d 401, 406-07 (1978). See
generally Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (a municipality may not
"stand in the way . . . where the general public interest . . . far outweigh[s] the interest of the
municipality"). Court-imposed restraints are of limited value, however, because substantive land use
guidelines will generally not be imposed absent specific legislative direction.
62. See R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 22 (also noting that cumulative damage
may be far harder to remedy than damage from isolated conspicuous sources); Pisano, supra note 24,
at 96 (nonpoint pollution usually results from "consecutive operations on extensive units of land").
63. See R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 235.
64. Cumulative impact review means that "the incremental effects of an individual project [are]
reviewed in connection with the effect of past projects, the effects of other current projects, and the
effects of probable future projects." CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30105.5 (West Supp. 1986).
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ity, the local land use regulations which in large part guide development
are a natural object of state regulation. 5
By encouraging or tolerating an environmentally harmful course of de-
velopment, a local government is in a very real sense a cause of the harm.
The wide use of conscriptive state land use programs indicates that many
states have acknowledged local government responsibility for harmful land
use practices. As a corollary to this responsibility, localities can in certain
circumstances be expected to subsidize (with assistance from state and fed-
eral government) the cost of groundwater and nonpoint source pollution
control. 6 Emphasis on local responsibility for pollution-causing land uses
also provides a justification for directing enforcement efforts at local gov-
ernments rather than at land users.
6
7
2. Local and State Interests
Regulation of the local regulatory effort, rather than of land users, also
accords due attention to competing values of purely local impact. When
developing a regulatory program pursuant to state guidelines, communi-
ties can accommodate a variety of local interests."' Upon review, the state
can analyze the impact of local plans on groundwater and nonpoint source
pollution and determine whether the local effort unnecessarily com-
promises regional interests.
In addition, state review of local plans is less burdensome on the state
than the two primary alternative methods of state land use control: direct
land use regulation of critical areas and direct review of all major develop-
ments. The former approach replaces local land use authority; the latter
duplicates it. As a practical matter, it is easier to regulate local regulations
than it is to regulate the myriad land uses that contribute to pollution.69
65. See Developments, supra note 46, at 1601. Under the California coastal program, for exam-
ple, researchers have evaluated the potential cumulative effects of local land use plans on both the
quantity and quality of local water supplies. See Comment, An Expanded Role for the State in
Regional Land Use Control, 70 CALIF. L. Rav. 151, 166-69 (1982).
66. Cf. Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of S. Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 427, 244 N.E.2d
700, 702, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129, 132 (1969) (local land use regulation may not "single out [a landowner]
to bear a heavy financial burden because of a general condition in the community") (citations omit-
ted). Such subsidies may be direct or indirect. For example, direct subsidization of farmers is widely
considered to be a prerequisite to control of agricultural nonpoint pollution. Harrington, Krupnick &
Peskin, supra note 30, at 31. Indirect subsidization may for example consist of government condemna-
tion of a buffer zone between a sensitive watercourse and urban development.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
68. Cf. City of Austin v. Jamail, 662 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) ("Local governments
are in a better position to address the problem of urban runoff for they are most familiar with local
growth patterns, local terrain, and their master plans of development.").
69. Nevertheless, direct state regulation may be desirable for very sensitive areas or particularly
dangerous pollution sources if local governments cannot develop the requisite regulatory resources.
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3. Enforcement
Enforcement of state land use guidelines designed to control ground-
water and nonpoint source pollution can be undertaken by both state and
local agencies, and by the courts. No single method of state enforcement
can be applied to all states and to all types of pollution problems.70 Ide-
ally, regulatory programs should use the threat of state-developed mea-
sures as an enforcement tool. In addition, local governments can justifiably
be penalized if they fail adequately to regulate land users. Once pollution-
causing land uses are allowed to proceed, it may be unfair7 or economi-
cally infeasible to terminate them. The only remedies may be prospective:
for example, prohibiting, or removing state and federal financial support
for, further development desired by the community. 2
Reliance solely on withholding government funding from noncompliant
localities is a barely adequate alternative, but may be the only politically
acceptable approach for at least some parts of the regulatory program.
Enforcement by the courts will be of particular value for programs that
rely largely on grant withholding. Even if state guidelines are not for-
mally enacted as law, courts can utilize them to determine whether an
environmentally harmful local land use decision is invalid because it
harms the regional welfare.7
III. OVERREGULATION
Any land use program must attend to spillovers caused by overregula-
tion in addition to those caused by underregulation.74 Overregulation oc-
curs when excessive local restrictions operate to exclude from a commu-
nity land uses which, from a regional standpoint, should be allowed to
take place in that community.7 5 Growing environmental concern has
70. For examples of state enforcement approaches, see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
71. Termination may be unfair if the land user reasonably relied upon a government prediction
that the land use would not compromise water quality goals.
72. In contrast, the comparative discreteness, obviousness, and reversibility of point source dis-
charges into surface waters generally make it more practicable and justifiable to penalize individual
polluters rather than inadequate regulators of those polluters.
73. See supra note 61.
74. Local land use controls have been heavily criticized for being unfairly or unnecessarily restric-
tive in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., PRESIDNT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING, THE REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING 200-02 (1982) (advocating heightened scrutiny of zoning
regulations which limit development of housing); Delogu, supra note 46 (local land use control should
be replaced by state/regional control); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973) (zoning should be replaced by
system of private adjustments implemented through lawsuits); Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYR-
ACUSE L. REV. 719, 748 (1980) (acceptances and rejections of requests for zoning changes should be
treated as administrative adjudications rather than legislative actions). This Part seeks to describe only
a few of the circumstances where reduction of local power over land use is appropriate.
75. Cf Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must End: Suggestions for Legislative
andJudicial Responses, 32 ME. L. REV. 29, 76 (1980) (Land use "[c]ontrols which significantly...
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brought increased pressure on local governments to exclude purportedly
harmful land uses and increased efforts by the states to prevent exclusions
that cause harm extending beyond local boundaries.
Because many types of land use have the potential to cause ground-
water or nonpoint source pollution," increased attention to such pollution
may result in excessive local land use restrictions that harm regional inter-
ests,77 and excessive judicial deference to such restrictions. At a particular
site, a variety of regulatory approaches, some more restrictive and some
less restrictive of development which is desirable from a regional stand-
point, may be adequate to control groundwater 8 and nonpoint 9 pollution
problems. Where more restrictive approaches cause adverse spillovers, less
restrictive approaches should be encouraged or required. Also, within a
particular region, land use in some areas may pose a greater threat to
water quality than land use in other areas.80 It may therefore be in the
regional interest to channel certain land uses from less safe areas to more
safe areas by removing excessive restrictions on those land uses in the
safer areas.81
As with underregulation, the costs of overregulation are due in large
part to defects in local land use decisionmaking processes. Thus, the states
preclude otherwise legal and in many cases socially necessary undertakings cannot be allowed to stand
on the basis of generalized fears, overbroad assumptions, or unsubstantiated apprehensions about the
existence of conditions which might give rise to harm.") (emphasis in original). My focus here is on
restrictions which, despite benefitting the general welfare, must be eliminated because they also harm
the general (regional) welfare. Judicial deference to land use regulations which, despite benefitting the
general welfare, impose burdens on individual landowners has also been the subject of intense criti-
cism. This Note nevertheless will assume that deference to the general welfare is appropriate.
76. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
77. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 589, 557 P.2d 473,
475-76, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 43-44 (1976) (noting "growing conflict between the efforts of suburban
communities to check disorderly development, with its concomitant problems of air and water pollu-
tion and inadequate public facilities, and the increasing public need for adequate housing opportuni-
ties"); V. NOVOTNv & G. CHESTERS, supra note 7, at 393, 396 (indicating that use of land use
regulation to control nonpoint pollution has potential to be simplistic and overbroad); Miller, supra
note 25, at 120 ("aquifer protection and growth are in many cases incompatible").
78. Regulations which focus narrowly on specific sources of pollution, or ambient water quality
programs which establish pollutant limitations on a highly technical, case-by-case basis, see V. PYE,
R. PATRICK & J. QUARLES, supra note 3, at 261-68, may provide less restrictive alternatives to
broadly sketched land use controls.
79. Less restrictive alternatives to the limitation of development that may cause nonpoint pollution
include runoff collection or drainage systems. See V. NovOTNY & G. CHEsTERS, supra note 7, at
459-84; DiNovo & Jaffe, supra note 11, at 13. But see Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.
2d 1374 (Fla.) (developer-proposed urban runoff drainage system would not eliminate nonpoint pollu-
tion risk; thus, state-imposed density restrictions on commercial development were justified), cert.
denied sub nom. Taylor v. Graham, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
80. For example, land use over clean sections of aquifers will be less desirable than land use over
already polluted sections. See Miller, supra note 25, at 123 (Long Island land use regulations
designed to protect groundwater permit industrial activity over polluted zone).
81. For example, the New Jersey Pine Barrens management plan, which, inter alia, is designed to
protect groundwater, directs growth to often unwilling communities in less sensitive areas within the
Pine Barrens. See R. BABCOCK & C. SIEMON, THE ZONING GAME REVISITED 145, 150 (1985).
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must regulate these processes. Attention to overregulation is of far greater
importance when government is the focus of a regulatory program than
when private actors are at issue: Government faces fewer incentives to act
efficiently, particularly because it is generally insulated from competitive
market pressures.
A. Environmental Spillovers
Local overregulation harms regional environmental interests when it
excludes pollution-causing activities from comparatively safe sites and dis-
places them into less safe areas, or entirely excludes environmentally es-
sential land uses from the region.82 Such overregulation causes health
hazards and regulatory difficulties that would not have occurred had the
safer sites been utilized.83 The effect is much like an environmental spil-
lover caused by underregulation.
A community may intentionally overregulate because it is unwilling to
deal with environmentally harmful land uses. Or, it may unintentionally
overregulate because it does not have the technical or financial ability to
tailor regulations to actual physical conditions.8 The resulting exclusions
may be entirely legitimate from a local standpoint.85 It is only when re-
gional environmental interests are taken into account that the restriction
constitutes overregulation. Broad exclusionary restrictions must then be
re-tailored by the state8" to correspond more reasonably to actual physical
conditions.
8 7
In the context of pollution control programs, states usually preempt or
82. See In re Zoning Permit Application of Patch, 140 Vt. 158, 168-69, 437 A.2d 121, 126
(1981) (town may not require sanitary landfill permit seeker to show "absolutely that the project will
not discharge toxic substances into the ground water" because that "would virtually preclude any
landfills in the state, since contamination of ground water is always a possibility").
83. See R. HEALY & J. RosENBRG, supra note 44, at 183 ("environmental damage is done
because the places most suited to the proposed project have rejected it locally").
84. See J. KusLER, supra note 45, at 96 ("Local government units often apply rigid, prohibitory
approaches" to sensitive area regulation due to insufficient technical or financial resources.); cf. Hop-
ping & Preston, The Water Quality Assurance Act of 1983-Florida's "Great Leap Forward" into
Groundwater Protection and Hazardous Waste Management, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 599, 617
(1983) (Florida prohibits local governments from enacting hazardous waste facility regulations more
stringent than those of state "[i]n recognition of the complexity and technical nature of most hazard-
ous waste regulations").
85. A community blind to the adverse regional impact of overbroad restrictions may see no reason
to incur the expense and effort needed to develop regulations more carefully tailored to existing physi-
cal conditions. Or, localities may intentionally choose to avoid all risk of pollution, however remote,
despite the fact that alternative sites pose greater risks. See Tarlock, Siting New or Expanded Treat-
ment, Storage, or Disposal Facilities: The Pigs in the Parlors of the 1980s, 17 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW. 429, 439 (1984).
86. See id. ("states have a comparative advantage over local governments in assembling and as-
sessing the information needed to make risk-benefit safety judgments").
87. Cf. Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 289-90 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (local
government may not frustrate state/federal PCB disposal program through total disposal ban designed
to protect groundwater; thus, local regulations must reasonably reflect actual physical conditions).
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override overly restrictive local land use regulations in order to site espe-
cially dangerous (and therefore locally very undesirable) activities. Many
states have imposed substantial limits on local land use controls in order to
facilitate the siting of hazardous waste facilities-one of the most danger-
ous sources of groundwater and nonpoint pollution. 8 The consideration
accorded to local land use restrictions on hazardous waste facilities varies
from state to state. Many state statutes preempt local restrictions that op-
erate to exclude state-approved facilities.8 Other states provide for over-
ride of local restrictions only upon a special finding by the state.9 In
either case, siting of hazardous waste facilities in violation of local restric-
tions is unlikely to occur unless it is necessary to meet an important state
or regional need. The statutes differ primarily in the level of necessity
which must be shown, and the formality with which necessity must be
proven.91
Broader use of state invalidation of excessive local restrictions as part of
a groundwater and nonpoint source pollution control program lacks one
compelling justification of legislation focused narrowly on hazardous
waste facility siting: the need to locate extremely dangerous activities at the
most suitable sites. Nevertheless, all invalidations of excessive restrictions
which cause environmental spillovers share a common justification: rejec-
tion of a purely local cost-benefit analysis. 2 Cost-benefit assessments
should instead be made from a regional perspective. This does not mean
that a project site which leaves the region with a net benefit should auto-
88. See CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note 7, at 66-85. For a detailed discussion of state
treatment of local land use controls in the hazardous waste facility siting context, see Tarlock, supra
note 85, at 438-48; Tarlock, Anywhere But Here: An Introduction to State Control of Hazardous-
Waste Facility Location, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL L. & PoL'y 1, 32-38 (1981).
89. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-79 (1982); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 3-705(d) (1983);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.28(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1986) (local restrictions preempted, but state will
apply local requirements if reasonable and consistent with state requirements); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
13:1E-63 (West Supp. 1985); OHfo REv. CODE ANN. 3734.05(D)(3) (Page Supp. 1985); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 26-14a-5(2)(a), 26-14a-8 (1984) (despite preemption, state will take zoning classifica-
tions into account in making siting decisions).
90. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.723 (Harrison Supp. 1984) (applicant may appeal local
denial; must clearly and convincingly establish that no significant adverse environmental or economic
impact will ensue); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 1, § 1040.1(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) (applicant
may appeal local denial to state board); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6018.504 (Purdon Supp. 1985)
(state may override local restrictions; justifications must be set forth in writing).
91. Energy facility siting has received similar treatment. In Montana, for example, the state en-
ergy facility siting board may override any local law or regulation if "as applied to the proposed
facility, the law or regulation is unreasonably restrictive in view of the existing technology, of factors
of cost or economics, or of the needs of consumers, whether located inside or outside of the directly
affected government subdivisions." MoNT. CODE ANN. § 75-20-301(2)(f) (1985). See also CAL PUB.
Rs. CODE § 25525 (West 1977) (analogous provision regarding power facility siting). For a discus-
sion of energy facility siting legislation, see Murray & Seneker, Industrial Siting: Allocating the
Burden of Pollution, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1978).
92. See C. MILLER & C. WOOD, supra note 50, at 222 ("a planning authority cannot make a
practice of simply rejecting [projects] which leave the local population ... with a net detriment and
no means of compensation").
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matically be accepted, whatever the local costs. Rather, it means that sit-
ing a land use in a particular locality should be required or encouraged
despite a net local detriment if even greater detriments would result from
the use of alternative sites within the region.9 3 Thus, if necessary to pre-
vent diversion of development to less environmentally suitable sites, a
community can justifiably be expected to tailor land use regulations to
actual physical needs, and to make reasonable efforts to deal with their
fair share of the pollution problems which inevitably accompany
development.
In addition to hazardous waste facilities, other readily identifiable
sources of groundwater or nonpoint pollution, such as nonhazardous
waste landfills and industries which use hazardous chemicals, may be the
most appropriate objects of a state tailoring requirement. Less discrete
sources of groundwater or nonpoint pollution, such as general urban or
residential development, may be less suitable for a tailoring requirement
unless it can be determined that local restrictions will divert such land
uses to less safe sites to a degree that significantly compromises regional
welfare. However, at least one state has included within a nonpoint pollu-
tion control program an administrative process-similar to the process
used by some states in regard to hazardous waste facilities-to review any
local disapproval or modification of a developer's nonpoint pollution con-
trol plan.
9 4
B. Socioeconomic Spillovers: Exclusionary Zoning
State modification of overly restrictive local land use regulations has not
received broad acceptance in existing pollution control programs, aside
from hazardous waste facility siting legislation. However, certain states
have been vigilant in invalidating excessive environmental land use con-
trols in the context of exclusionary zoning.95
Exclusionary zoning operates, intentionally or unintentionally, to ex-
clude from a community lower income residents or growth in general.9
The result is an adverse socioeconomic spillover consisting of harm to
those who wish to gain admission to the community, and to those commu-
nities which host an unfairly large share of the excluded development. By
invalidating excessive land use restrictions, the state imposes an obligation
93. See id. at 222-23.
94. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-61(c) (1983) (sediment pollution control).
95. See generally J. KUSHNER, FAIR HousING §§ 7.08-7.10 (1983) (discussion of exclusionary
zoning).
96. Although growth controls often exclude lower or middle income families, see id. § 7.07,
growth control cases center on exclusion of land uses rather than of certain classes of people. See
Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 193 n.10, 382 A.2d 105, 110 n.10 (1977).
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on local units of government to bear a fair share of regional housing or
development needs."
Because localities often cite environmental problems in order to justify
exclusionary zoning, state review of local environmental land use regula-
tions can play a significant role in eliminating exclusionary zoning. The
method states have used to eliminate exclusionary environmental land use
regulations is quite similar to the method used to control excessive restric-
tions which cause environmental spillovers: The state requires restrictions
to be tailored more closely to actual physical conditions when broader re-
strictions have undesirable regional effects.
98 In both situations, the tradi-
tional deference to local land use restrictions is abandoned in favor of a
heightened scrutiny approach: The need to maintain existing local health
and safety restrictions is balanced against the regional interest in modify-
ing the restrictions.99
In several major cases, courts have rejected claims by localities that po-
tential groundwater and/or nonpoint source pollution problems justified
exclusionary zoning restrictions. 00 The fact that density restrictions are
both an effective method of groundwater and nonpoint source pollution
control 0  and a common means of exclusionary zoning
02 suggests the po-
97. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel
II), 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (fair share of regional lower income housing needs); National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (fair
share of regional demand for growth).
98. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II),
92 N.J. 158, 259, 456 A.2d 390, 441 (1983) (to extent necessary to meet Mount Laurel housing
requirements, "municipalities must remove zoning and subdivision restrictions ... that are not neces-
sary to protect health and safety") (footnote omitted); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Town-
ship Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 526, 215 A.2d 597, 609 (1965) (instead of broad exclusionary
zoning, more specific legislatively approved methods must be used to deal with groundwater pollution
caused by growth).
99. At least one exclusionary zoning case has explicitly held that "closer scrutiny" must be ap-
plied to zoning provisions which "in addition to promoting legitimate zoning goals, also halvel effects
contrary to the general welfare." Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 139,
405 A.2d 381, 388 (1979). See also infra note 116.
100. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Lau-
rel I), 67 N.J. 151, 186, 336 A.2d 713, 731 (exclusion of lower income housing), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765
(1970) (growth controls); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419
Pa. 504, 525-26, 215 A.2d 597, 608-09 (1965) (same).
In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977) (over-
ruled on other grounds by Mount Laurel If), the plaintiff argued that carefully tailored controls could
eliminate the water problems which Madison asserted in justification of its broad exclusionary restric-
tions. Id. at 544, 371 A.2d at 1223. The court endorsed the general principle of "tailoring." See id. at
512, 544-45, 371 A.2d at 1207, 1223-24.
101. See supra note 31. For cases in which large lot requirements were upheld for groundwater
and/or nonpoint pollution control purposes, see, e.g., DeMars v. Zoning Comm'n, 142 Conn. 580,
115 A.2d 653 (1955); Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 349 So. 2d 667 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Bogert v. Township of Washington, 25 N.J. 57, 135 A.2d 1 (1957); Salamar
Builders Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 275 N.E.2d 585, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1971); Caruthers v.
Board of Adjustment, 290 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
102. See D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQuITY 80 (1981).
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tential for conflict between local water quality concerns and regional so-
cioeconomic interests. But any type of cost-producing land use regulation
has exclusionary potential.103 Thus the state should scrutinize local land
use restrictions designed to control groundwater or nonpoint source pollu-
tion in order to identify when environmental concerns are used as a mere
pretext for illegitimate exclusionary goals.? ° In addition, the state should
take steps to reconcile legitimate local environmental concerns with press-
ing regional needs by applying heightened scrutiny to local land use regu-
lations that have the potential to restrict fulfillment of those needs.1 05
C. The Need for Legislative Intervention
The courts will not adequately control overregulation absent specific
legislative direction. Standing requirements preclude many suits based on
103. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 259,
456 A.2d 390, 441-42 (1983) (Mount Laurel II) (exclusionary zoning can be controlled by eliminat-
ing cost-generating restrictions not necessary to maintain minimum standards of health and safety); R.
HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 25; Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic
and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 391 (1977) ("Instead of placing numerical restrictions on the
supply of housing, [a municipality] might impose burdensome development standards to inhibit hous-
ing construction.").
104. Noting that all development has some environmental impact, the court in Mount Laurel I
cautioned that ecological concerns must not be used as "a makeweight to support exclusionary housing
measures or preclude growth." Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel
(Mount Laurel I), 67 N.J. 151, 187, 336 A.2d 713, 731, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S.
808 (1975). The problem of pretext in the environmental context has received much scholarly atten-
tion. See, e.g., R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 25 (noting frequent use of "the rhetoric
of the environmental movement . . . to mask more fundamental issues of class and race"); Delogu,
supra note 46, at 285 ("The exclusion of . . . socially necessary undertakings is seldom done di-
rectly. . . . Instead, when a municipality is confronted with a type of development it does not want
. . . it talks about potential environmental harm, traffic problems, soil and water limitations, and
neighborhood impact.").
105. There are, of course, other environmental factors besides water pollution which are used to
justify exclusionary zoning. Efforts to maintain subjective aesthetic values or "local character" are
often an excuse for maintaining the exclusionary status quo. Thus, these factors should generally be
accorded little value. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel
(Mount Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 277, 456 A.2d 390, 451 (1983); Vickers v. Township Comm., 37
N.J. 232, 269, 181 A.2d 129, 149 (1962) (Hall, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
371 U.S. 233 (1963); Delogu, supra note 46, at 286-88.
Objective factors deserving attention are limited in number. Mount Laurel II indicates that such
considerations as suitability of terrain for development and preservation of water quality and prime
agricultural land may justify restrictions on housing in communities which have not met their fair
share obligations. Mount Laurel 11, 92 N.J. at 311-12, 316, 456 A.2d 390, 469, 471. Restrictions
enacted in response to legitimate objective concerns nevertheless should be scrutinized where they have
the potential to cause regional harm. Of the factors mentioned in Mount Laurel II, water quality
concerns are perhaps the least site specific and most technically oriented. Thus, local deference to state
and federal standards is especially justified.
Tailoring land use regulations more strictly to physical conditions does not sacrifice environmental
interests. Indeed, broad land use restrictions may be less effective than narrow restrictions which focus
directly on the actual source of the problem. See D. HosKINs, LAND USE, WATER QUALITY AND
ECOSYSTEM INTEGRITY IN THE NEW JERSEY PINELANDS 57-58 (1984) (unpublished Environmental
Defense Fund paper on file with author) (though control of nonpoint pollution of ground and surface
waters could be achieved through increased lot sizes, requirement instead of more efficient septic
system "may be politically, economically and ecologically more acceptable").
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regional harms, especially when such suits are brought by nonresidents of
the offending community 10 6 Although environmental land use regulation
is a technically complex matter, zoning boards commonly are not required
to make factual findings to justify their decisions.
117 And because zoning is
considered a legislative process, courts are generally deferent to zoning
restrictions.0 8 When a challenge is premised on adverse regional conse-
quences, the challenger faces an extraordinary burden of proof.'
0 9 Fur-
thermore, the court may examine only the local impact of a restriction.
That is, it may balance community benefit against only the harm done to
the plaintiff instead of against the broader, regional harm.
10 Or, the court
may feel that accommodation of divergent local and regional interests is a
policy matter best left to the legislature.' Even if the challenge is suc-
cessful, courts generally are neither willing 1 ' nor able
1 3 to design and
implement less restrictive regulations." 4
State land use legislation can play a number of useful roles in eliminat-
ing excessive restrictions designed to control groundwater or nonpoint
source pollution. The state can set up an administrative appeals process
enabling expert state agencies, or other interested parties, to challenge lo-
cal land use decisions. In addition, it can provide standards to help courts
or administrative review agencies decide whether land use regulations are
106. See Note, The Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act of 1973: Legislating a Na-
tional Land Use Policy, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 604, 607 & n.29 (1973).
107. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 102, at 32; see also DeMars v. Zoning Comm'n, 142 Conn.
580, 584, 115 A.2d 653, 655 (1955) (upholding large lot requirement designed to protect groundwater
despite absence of scientific support).
108. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); 82 AM. JUR. 2D
Zoning and Planning §§ 25-30 (1976).
109. See Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights of the Whole
World?, I FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 234, 253 (1973) ("herculean burden" to demonstrate local, regional
and state-as opposed to individual-ramifications of zoning).
110. In a few exclusionary zoning cases, courts have indicated that zoning ordinances which ap-
pear valid from a local standpoint may nevertheless be invalid because of adverse regional conse-
quences. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 607, 557 P.2d 473, 487,
135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 55 (1976); Home Builders League v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 139, 405
A.2d 381, 388 (1979).
111. See, e.g., Construction Ind. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 908
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102,
111, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975).
112. Courts rarely mandate specific zoning revisions because they are reluctant to interfere with
municipal legislative power. See D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLA-
TION 6 (1976).
113. See Developments, supra note 46, at 1595 (courts possess "less expertise and fewer re-
sources" than land use agencies for ensuring environmentally safe land use practices).
114. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Lau-
rel I), 67 N.J. 151, 186, 336 A.2d 713, 731 (court suggested, but did not mandate, less restrictive
groundwater protection measures), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 526, 215 A.2d 597, 609
(1965) (court noted existence of less restrictive legislatively approved methods of controlling ground-
water pollution, but did not mandate use of such methods).
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in fact overly restrictive.' 5 Finally, state legislation can determine which
regional interests deserve special consideration, and where within the state
local efforts to control groundwater or nonpoint source pollution should be
scrutinized for excessive restrictions on those regional interests.1 1 Height-
ened scrutiny may be prescribed in order to prevent diversion of pollution-
causing land uses to more sensitive areas, to prevent exclusion of growth
or lower income housing, to protect farmland, 1 7 or to protect other re-
gional interests. 118
115. See, e.g., Kasparek v. Johnson County Bd. of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511, 519 (Iowa 1980)
(reliance on State Dep't of Health regulations to invalidate large lot requirement designed to protect
groundwater); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel
II), 92 N.J. 158, 259, 456 A.2d 390, 442 (1983) (building standards developed by federal government
and by university research center "[p]articulary helpful, though in no way conclusive as to what the
minimum standards should be in a particular community"); Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466,
476-78, 268 A.2d 765, 769-70 (1970) (reliance on State Standards for Individual Sewage Disposal
Systems to invalidate large lot requirement designed to prevent groundwater pollution).
116. Under Mount Laurel II, for example, the obligation to provide for a fair share of regional
housing needs is imposed only upon communities within areas which the State Development Guide
Plan designates as "growth." In such areas, once a plaintiff demonstrates that "the land use regula-
tions fail to provide a realistic opportunity for low and moderate income housing," the burden shifts to
the community to disprove or justify this failure. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township
of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 222-23, 456 A.2d 390, 422 (1983). Thus, in effect,
restrictions in growth areas receive heightened scrutiny. See also Board of Appeals v. Housing Ap-
peals Comm. in the Dep't of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 339, 365-67, 294 N.E.2d 393, 412-13
(1973) (for communities which have not met minimum obligation to provide lower income housing,
state antiexclusionary statute requires housing boards of appeals to closely scrutinize local land use
regulations to determine whether regional need for lower income housing outweighs local need for
health, safety, or aesthetic restrictions).
Ordinary or relaxed scrutiny should be applied to groundwater and nonpoint pollution regulations
where it is unlikely that such regulations will have a significant adverse effect on regional interests.
For example, in Albano v. Mayor and Township Comm., 194 N.J. Super. 265, 476 A.2d 852 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), the plaintiff challenged a large lot requirement adopted by a "non-
growth" community to control nonpoint pollution. Pollution control arguably could have been
achieved through either a large lot size or a smaller lot size with supplementary protective measures.
See id. at 271, 275-76, 476 A.2d at 854-55, 857. The trial judge apparently read Mount Laurel II to
require lessened scrutiny of the large lot requirement because the township was in a nongrowth area.
See id. at 273, 476 A.2d at 856. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to allow the
requirement to stand, though it did not reach the Mount Laurel II issue. Id. at 277, 476 A.2d at 858.
117. State efforts to protect farmland have restricted local use of agricultural land regulation to
control groundwater and nonpoint pollution. See V. NovoTNY & G. CHESrERS, supra note 7, at 20
(nonpoint pollution); DiNovo & Jaffe, supra note 30, at 6 (groundwater).
118. Austin, Texas, has imposed locally a land use program that accommodates many of the
interests listed above in a manner similar to that suggested in this Note. Austin lies amongst several
watersheds which are sensitive to nonpoint pollution of ground and surface waters. Development in
all areas can be expected to contribute to the problem. The Austin watershed ordinances identify
comparatively safe areas, and attempt to direct pollution-causing development to these areas. In one
watershed, demand for growth is particularly high. Here, the ordinances impose "very specific and
detailed stormwater engineering" instead of the broader density and development-prohibition regula-
tions utilized in other watersheds. "These runoff controls substitute, in part, for restrictions that
would limit development intensities." See DiNovo & Jaffe, supra note 11, at 12-13.
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IV. STATE LAND USE REGULATION: A CONCLUSION
As suggested earlier, the local focus on amenity concerns rather than
technical problems is a key cause of underregulation of land use practices
which cause groundwater or nonpoint source pollution.
1 9 Overregulation
results largely from the same focus: Excessively stringent controls, such as
overbroad health regulations or attempts to exclude growth or lower in-
come housing, represent a departure from strictly technical concerns. But
this does not necessarily mean that a local focus on amenity issues is un-
desirable. Local governments should retain primary responsibility for pro-
tecting local amenity values. 120 Technical requirements, on the other
hand, to the extent that they are overlooked by local governments, and to
the extent that they are susceptible to standardization,
1 2 ' are particularly
appropriate objects of state concern. The state's role can largely be limited
to supplementing local land use regulations with more restrictive technical
requirements when underregulation has adverse regional effects and re-
placing local land use regulations with less restrictive technical require-
ments when overregulation has adverse regional effects. Such an approach
may be essential if centralized land use regulation is to be politically ac-
ceptable. Technical issues, insofar as they are more "objective" than
amenity issues, are an ideal focus for something as controversial as cen-
tralized land use regulation.122 It is precisely the narrow, technical focus
of groundwater and nonpoint source pollution control that makes it an
appropriate object of federal, as well as state, land use regulation.1
23
119. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
120. Cf Little, Preservation Policy and Personal Perception: A 200-Million-Acre Misunder-
standing, in LAND IN AM.RICA 83, 84-85, 96-97 (R. Andrews ed. 1979) (indicating that centralized
land use regulation may take an overly scientific approach to preservation of aesthetic values).
121. See id. at 84-85 (air and water quality more easily quantifiable than "land quality;" thus
the former are more susceptible to state control than the latter).
122. See R. HEALY & J. ROSENBERG, supra note 44, at 107-08 (California coastal planning
commission focused initially on environmental problems rather than amenity problems such as recrea-
tion, appearance, transportation, and intensity of development, because the former were less contro-
versial); Mandelker, The Quiet Revolution Reconsidered, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Aug. 1979,
at 4, 5 (state land use regulation demanded specific, relatively uncontroversial focus-protecting the
environment-to be politically acceptable). But see Strong, Land as a Public Good: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come Again, in THE LAND USE POLICY DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES 217, 227 (J. de
Neufville ed. 1981) (centralized land use regulation should be comprehensive rather than narrowly
focused on water or air pollution control).
123. In the early 1970's, Congress gave extensive consideration to, but ultimately rejected, a Na-
tional Land Use Planning Act (NLUP). This comprehensive Act was to provide several hundred
million dollars in planning funds to participating states adhering to federal guidelines. See generally
Note, supra note 106 (describing NLUP). The Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1451-1464 (1982), enacted in 1972, utilizes an approach broadly analogous to that of NLUP, but is
directed at a specific objective: protection of the coast. Though voluntary, all coastal states have partic-
ipated. See R. JACKSON, LAND USE IN AMERICA 57 (1981). See generally Caldwell, supra note 50,
at 206 ("focus on specific land abuses might offer a more meaningful and acceptable approach to land
use planning than general statutory authorization").
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V. THE FEDERAL ROLE
The Clean Water Act declared war on water pollution. This war can-
not be won without effective control of groundwater and nonpoint source
pollution. Effective control is impossible absent land use regulation. The
federal government should therefore acknowledge, encourage, and expand
upon recent developments in state land use regulation to mobilize nation-
wide employment of land use regulation to control groundwater and
nonpoint source pollution. Efforts must be made to break down the con-
servative bias of present land use law."' At least for the purposes of
groundwater and nonpoint source pollution control, land use regulation
must be viewed as simply another tool with which to preserve water
quality.
The fundamental federal role should be to promote state review of local
regulations. Federal legislation must set forth procedural and substantive
standards to guide state programs, and should provide for federal
enforcement.
12 5
Procedural standards should require the creation or employment of
state agencies which have the authority to carry out a review program.
These agencies must be able to develop land use guidelines for the control
of groundwater and nonpoint source pollution, require local governments
to prepare regulations corresponding to the guidelines, and take effective
enforcement actions against noncompliant localities . 26 Federal standards
124.
[W]hen rational, nonhistorical approches [sic] are made to present day land use problems, they
often run head-on into a psychological wall of obdurate incompatible attitudes and behavior
patterns. The intense emotional hostility with which many people react to almost any land use
control measure cannot generally be explained wholly by reference to economic self-interest.
Caldwell, supra note 50, at 188.
125. The federal government presently has no programs that directly require state or local land
use regulation. See R. JACKsoN, supra note 123, at 60-61. The National Flood Insurance Program,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1982), is perhaps the most extensive federal program which significantly
penalizes communities which fail to conform their land use regulations to federal guidelines. See id. §
4102 (guidelines for land management and use). The Program directs federal agencies to deny federal
financial assistance, and prohibit lending institutions from loaning money, to projects in areas with
special flood hazards unless the community in which the area is located participates in the Program.
Id. § 4106.
But the federal government is no stranger to using environmental programs to influence the alloca-
tion of authority over land use. By virtue of their control over the construction and location of sewers
and sewage treatment plants, regional section 208 agencies have a considerable influence over localgrowth patterns. Sewer construction is perhaps the prime determinant of the location of development.
See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrTY, THE FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 36-39 (1974). Indeed, Congress clearly intended section 208 plans to
affect land use and zoning plans. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668, 3704; see also Godschalk & Brower, supra note 46, at 161 (federal
planning programs, including section 208, have "been the primary catalyst for institutionalizing a
regional perspective").
126. Section 208 of CWA sets forth detailed requirements regarding the authority which agencies
charged with implementing the provision must possess. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(c)(2)(A)-(I) (1982). The
Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), which provides federal funding to support coastal land
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should require the agencies to have some means of controlling overregula-
tion as well as underregulation.127
In regard to substantive requirements, the federal-state relationship
should resemble the state-local relationship.
128 The EPA should develop
guidelines for state programs; if a state does not comply, the EPA must
take enforcement measures.2 ' Most federal environmental legislation op-
erates in this fashion. Federal guidelines should focus on promoting uni-
formity among the states to avoid pollution haven problems,
130 and on
preventing interstate environmental spillovers.
Federal enforcement efforts should primarily attempt to effect an ap-
propriate disposition of state and local land use regulatory power. Direct
federal land use regulation may be administratively burdensome and
should be employed only as a last resort. Enforcement should take place
in two steps. First, the EPA should make every effort to encourage states
to develop and implement the program. Federal environmental grants of
all kinds should be conditioned on adequate state performance.
Second, if a state refuses to develop an adequate state program pursu-
ant to federal guidelines, the EPA should develop the state program.
131
Conscriptive implementation of the program by ordering state or local
governments to enact appropriate regulations, though potentially an effec-
tive approach, presents considerable political obstacles.
32 The EPA there-
management programs meeting largely procedural federal guidelines, requires participant 
states to
regulate land use in the coastal zone. If the state chooses not to directly regulate coastal land 
use, it
must either establish "criteria and standards for local implementation, subject to administrative 
review
and enforcement," or review local "development plans, projects, or land and water use regulations."
16 U.S.C. § 1455(e)(1) (1982).
127. CZMA requires participating states to provide a method of assuring that "local land and
water use regulations within the coastal zone do not unreasonably restrict or exclude land and water
uses of regional benefit." 16 U.S.C. § 1455(e)(2) (1982).
128. See supra text accompanying note 56.
129. One version of the SDWA Amendments of 1986 proposed by the House of Representatives
took a step in this direction in regard to groundwater. It required states to prepare for each under-
ground source of drinking water plans which describe "the location and types of human development
which affect the source and the types of such development which can occur without resulting in 
the
degradation of such sources." S. 124, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. sec. 203, § 1443A(a)(3) 131 CONG. RE.
S9254 (daily ed. July 10, 1985). The state would then develop groundwater protection measures 
in
accordance with these plans. Id. 1443A(a)(4). This provision was eliminated from the final version 
of
the Amendments.
130. State land use programs, like local programs, may be explicitly directed at promoting indus-
trial and economic growth. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 90-1-101 (1985). Though of course such
approaches are not inherently objectionable, they indicate that state land use programs may actually
contribute to the pollution haven problem on an interstate level.
131. The EPA's lack of authority to develop section 208 plans if state efforts are inadequate 
is
perhaps the biggest obstacle to effective federal enforcement of the land planning aspects of this
provision.
132. This issue has been thoroughly treated in Stewart, supra note 53. Stewart's analysis is
guided by the now overruled case of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which
held that Congressional commerce power violates the Tenth Amendment if it: (1) regulates the "States
as States;" (2) addresses matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty;" and (3)
impairs the states' ability to "structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental 
func-
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fore must rely on grant withholding sanctions and direct enforcement ac-
tions against violative land uses. It can withhold EPA funding from local
units,133 or order the termination of all federal funding for projects located
in sensitive areas,13 4 in order to encourage local governments to comply
with the EPA's state guidelines. In addition, the EPA can proceed against
specific pollution-causing land uses which violate state guidelines. For ex-
ample, the EPA could withhold federal support from violative projects13 5
or negotiate agreements with government authorities which have control
over potentially violative projects.136 Or, the EPA can exercise more direct
control over land use by developing appropriate ambient standards and
tions." Id. at 845, 852. Nevertheless, Stewart concludes that federal conscription of state regulatory
powers to control private parties may be constitutional under National League of Cities where federal
suits "against individual polluters are too cumbersome and expensive to serve as a realistic alterna-
tive," and interstate environmental or economic spillovers are present. Stewart, supra note 53, at
1249-50. Federal intrusion into state sovereignty is justified in these circumstances because the exis-
tence of a spillover indicates a strong federal interest, and the fact that individual suits are too cum-
bersome shows that intrusion into state sovereignty is necessary to vindicate that federal interest. See
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 n.29 (1981) (federal
intrusion into state sovereignty is constitutional despite violation of three-pronged National League of
Cities test if "the nature of the federal interest advanced [is] such that it justifies state submission");
see also Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 261 (3d Cir. 1974) (EPA can compel exercise of state
legislative and administrative powers to carry out federal Clean Air Act requirements because "[tihe
states have, by their transportation policies, contributed to the problem of air pollution from automo-
bile emissions, and they can be required to take affirmative actions to correct it"). But see District of
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("mere fact that direct federal regulation of
vehicles would be less 'efficient' would not appear sufficient to override the serious intrusion on state
sovereignty involved" in EPA regulations requiring states to administer and enforce Clean Air -Act
provisions; thus such regulations violate Tenth Amendment), vacated and remanded sub nom. EPA
v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
In the wake of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) (over-
ruling National League of Cities), it is presumably up to Congress rather than the courts to determine
whether the federal government may order state or local governments to adjust land use regulatory
practices in order to control groundwater and nonpoint pollution. See id. at 1018-21 (relying on
national political processes to protect states' rights). But cf. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-62 (1982) (Supreme Court "never has sanctioned explicitly a federal
command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations . . ").
133. The EPA has on occasion tried to use sewerage grant withholding to influence local land use
plans. See Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 186-93 (3d Cir. 1983) (EPA grant
condition aimed at stopping development in New Jersey coastal floodplain struck down because EPA
lacked clear statutory authority and existing state land use regulation was adequate); Ellickson, supra
note 103, at 435 (EPA sewerage construction grant withholding used as method of growth control).
134. For an example of such an enforcement approach used by the National Flood Insurance
Program, see supra note 125.
135. "Federal support" includes both federal grants and federal contracts. The EPA currently can
prohibit federal support in order to protect certain aquifers. See supra note 34. Most major land uses
involve federal aid of some kind. Comment, The Environmental Protection Agency and Coastal Zone
Management: Striking a Federal-State Balance of Power in Land Use Management, 11 Hos. L.
REv. 1152, 1156 (1974).
136. In 1980, environmental groups filed a lawsuit alleging that highway construction in Florida
would cause groundwater pollution by attracting residential and industrial development. Shortly
thereafter, the EPA successfully sought re-evaluation by the Federal Highway Administration and the
Florida Department of Transportation of the number and location of highway interchanges. See Flor-
ida Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 506 F. Supp. 350, 370-71 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
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vigorously policing violations due to land use practices,
3 by imposing
land management requirements on locally permitted land uses,
1 8 or by




The narrow, relatively objective goal of groundwater and nonpoint
source pollution control makes it an ideal object of federally mandated
state land use regulation. Because the program proposed in this Note re-
lies largely on local preparation of control plans pursuant to state guide-
lines, local governments are given the opportunity to reconcile the need to
control groundwater and nonpoint source pollution with other local land
use considerations. On the state level, the proposed review process will
emphasize what many states have already realized: Local land use regula-
tion has adverse regional effects which must be policed by the state. Fi-
nally, the federal government must mandate such a policing effort in order
to fulfill the promise of the Clean Water Act. By requiring state control of
local land use regulation, the federal government can ensure that the na-
tional water pollution problem is dealt with adequately and fairly.
137. Cf. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 588-89 (9th Cir.
1985) (action brought by private party in response to violation by silvicultural nonpoint 
pollution of
ambient standards set forth in section 208 plan). Ambient standards are essentially performance 
stan-
dards, an increasingly popular method of land use regulation which allows development 
to proceed
freely as long as it does not cause specified adverse effects. See Delogu, supra note 46, 
at 301-02.
138. The federal government already has authority in limited circumstances to prescribe land
management requirements in order to control nonpoint pollution. See supra note 35.
139. The EPA may in fact need to promulgate some such bans as part of its federal guidelines.
See generally South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 677 (1st Cir. 1974) (under Commerce
Clause, "EPA [is] free to promulgate rules that resemble local zoning ordinances").
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